International Comparisons

The major research emphasis of the Enlightenment Network will be comparison, particularly the comparison of nations or their large political subdivisions. The webmaster spent many years researching such comparisons. The results of his first efforts were included in Cultural Regions of the United States(1975). The results of his second efforts were included in his surveys of Freedom in the World (1973-1989).

In our efforts for the Network, however, we will not be focusing on ratings. We will be looking for socially significant differences or similarities among societies, particularly in their policy performance, and the reasons for these differences. In this process, we will be cognizant of the fact that historical and cultural differences (culture being to a large extent the output of history) among societies make comparisons hard to evaluate and sometimes meaningless. Some performance areas for comparison that immediately come to mind are the presence or absence of violence and the quality of health care.

Perhaps the best-known result of my Cultural Regions effort was the study of homicide in the United States. It has long been known that homicide rates in the United States are higher than those in any other modern developed society. But what is not as well known is that homicide rates in the country have for over a century shown a gradient from north to south, so that the rates in North Dakota and Vermont are similar to the relatively low rates across the border in Canada, while rates in the states of the old south have been many times higher. Explaining this result has been complicated by the fact that African-Americans have in the twentieth century had overall rates ten times those of the general population. Since the Southern states have continued to generally have a much higher percentage of black residents, this obviously affects the results. Two considerations, however, show that the north to south gradient is still significant. First, a careful, if amateurish, study of rates north and south in the 1870s showed the extreme working of the gradient even though statistics for black Americans were hardly included in the author's data base. Secondly, in analyzing more recent statistics by state, it is possible to show that for whites alone the same state to state differential exists — although it is not as extreme as when the whole population is included.

The primary "explanation" we can have for such differences is cultural, which is ultimately historical. Regional differences in tendencies toward violence were reported even at the time of the Revolutionary War. They can be traced back in part to the different origins in the British Isles of state populations in the North and South. In the South, violent tendencies brought over from the British Isles were exacerbated for both whites and blacks by the experience of slavery and the quasi-slavery that followed slavery. One also notes a relationship of state violence with personal violence. The United States not only has the highest homicide rates in the modern world, but it is also remarkable for its unwillingness to abandon the death penalty. The death penalty is, again, more common as we move from north to south in the country, both in terms of its legality and the actual number of executions that are carried out.

Considering the latter issue as a policy issue, we note that the presence of capital punishment is inversely related to homicide rates, that is, the more capital punishment, the more homicide. As we have said above, legally prescribed and private violence are correlated. The defenders of capital punishment will point out that capital punishment is more likely to be required, or demanded, where there is a high homicide rate. Whatever the reasons, careful comparative studies may help us to get behind the figures so that we might understand the cultural causes for differences. Within this constraint, an analyst might then be able to see whether policy changes might be desirable or feasible in some states (or countries, for the same arguments can be applied to countries).

The study of variations in homicide rates by state was for me a second choice. I had intended to examine variations in suicide rates. I switched to homicide for two reasons: suicide did not vary as much by state as homicide and suicide statistics were much less reliable than homicide (suicides are often not correctly reported for insurance or cultural reasons). However, suicide remains an important international comparison topic. There has been a well-known and relatively stable variation in suicide rates among countries. Historically, the highest rates have been in a Central European "suicide zone". If we look at the most recent WHO figures we find that today the highest rates are found in Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Sweden and Belgium. Hungary's rate is more than three and one-half times that of the United States. As the observer moves away from the center of this zone, the rates more or less steadily decline. Incidentally, the presence of guns and gun control seem to have less effect on these figures than might be supposed.

In the underdeveloped world, we similarly find many statistical variations that cry out for investigation. The development fraternity has frequently pointed to the outstanding performance of the state of Kerala in southern India. In spite of being one of India's poorest states, it has been one of its leaders in bringing down the birth rate, reducing infant mortality, and the achievement of high literacy. Many reasons have been adduced, from Kerala's unique ethnic and religious composition to the intense involvement of the general public in political life. More than elsewhere in India, local governments have successfully redistributed what little money and resources is available to the poorest people. In any event, one cannot do international development analysis without thinking a little about Kerala.

Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) presents another but more complicated case for comparative analysis. After independence in the 1940s, through democratic institutions Sri Lanka came under the political control of a small number of highly educated and often interrelated individuals. It was favored with a socially conscious but elite government that unlike many third-world democracies alternated individuals in power. Perhaps for this reason, Sri Lanka rapidly achieved relatively favorable social statistics for a developing country with a low GNP. For its area of the world, it rapidly achieved high literacy rates and very low infant mortality and birth rates. But it has in more recent years been wracked by internal violence that has masked its achievements. We should take a moment to consider what has happened and what this may mean for other developing countries.

Ethnically, the Sri Lankans are divided among several cross-cutting groups. About 75% speak Sinhala as their native language. 18% speak Tamil. The Sinhala are mostly believers in Buddhism, while the Tamil speakers are divided among the adherents of Hinduism and Islam. (There are also many Christians and English is spoken more widely by Sri Lankans than by Indians.) At first, the country managed its internal divisions successfully. But increasingly aggressive Sinhalese nationalists managed to prevail upon the government to change the country's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in the 1970s. From this time forward, relations between the Tamils and the Sinhala have soured. This has been in spite of the fact that the native Tamils (as opposed to those from India, some of whom have been repatriated) were able to attain high positions in government and administration and continue to play a major role in the capital city, Colombo. Yet out of mounting fear of discrimination and displacement, and after several failures of the government to implement agreements to give the Tamils more power in the Tamil homelands in the north and east, a Tamil Tiger liberation movement demanding a separate state in the north emerged in the 1980s and has persisted despite years of violent struggle. Less than 10% of the population, primarily native Hindu Tamils, are directly involved in the movement. India inserted its troops between the warring groups in 1987 in an attempt to establish a basis for peace. They withdrew in 1990 without having achieved anything.

The Tamil Tiger resistance movement has been exceedingly violent and effective. Its violence has been directed in many cases against Tamils within and without the small areas that it dominates. Any Tamil who makes gestures toward peace is likely to be killed by the Tigers. The movement has regularly recruited children barely into their teens. It has used suicide bombing on a large scale (including notably the killing of the Indian Prime Minister in India because they thought he was siding with the Colombo).

The inability of Colombo, even with outside assistance, to overcome the Tigers should give pause to anyone concerned with internal struggles such as that in Iraq. The first point to note is that the struggle has continued in spite of the relatively good state of the country's democracy (for a while the Tamil party — non-Tiger — was the chief opposition party). Considering comparable situations, the Tamils are not a seriously repressed minority. The second point is that the Tigers have maintained a struggle dependant to a major degree on suicide bombings even though they are thoroughly secular and receive little assistance from non-Tamils outside the country. (A few overseas Tamils support the Tigers with money, but one hears of very few outsiders coming to the country to help the Tigers.) This suggests that an analytical estimate of the time it should take the Americans and the new Shi'a dominated government in Iraq to put down the Sunni and Baath-based insurgency may not be possible.

These comments offer a taste of the ways in which international and state comparisons may be used to add new dimensions to policy discussions.