We will not consider the extent to which America was misled into the war by leaders with obscured agendas. Those who misled the nation were themselves misled by their ignorance.

Early and near-fatal mistakes

Our plans for Iraq were based on the idea that we would easily and quickly defeat the Iraqis. It was expected that we would be welcomed as saviours from the oppression of Saddam Hussein. With a little American help the country would then establish a democracy and reconstruction could begin.

In reaching this conclusion, those who had achieved power in the White House dismissed an elaborate analysis and plan developed by Middle East experts in the State Department. We were left with a plan for victory, but none for the peace that would follow. This was mistake No.1. It meant that when we achieved victory, no provision had been made for policing the country. When looting of private property, civil institutions, and ammunition dumps developed , our forces were ill prepared to react.

The second mistake was to dismiss everyone in both the civil and military services. Since the economy was overwhelming in the hands of state institutions, and the military and bureaucracy had employed millions, this meant that a large proportion of Iraqis, especially the middle class, were put out of work. It also meant that civil institutions, including services of all kinds, collapsed or came close to collapse. It meant that there was no Arabic speaking force capable of dealing with the lawlessness that broke out on all sides.

Why We were not Liked

When our soldiers went among Iraqis, they were too often seen as enemies rather than friends. The the interaction of soldier and civilian segued into lingering hatred and then full-fledged insurgency.

The first reason for hatred was that both American and British forces carried a great deal of historical baggage. In 1920, British imposed on Iraq a Sunni Arab monarch with no ties to Mesopotamia, and created boundaries that ignored the wishes of the people. They then proceeded to put down with heavy loss of life revolts by the Shi'a and Kurds. Even after Iraq achieved "independence", British influence remained strong, leading to another British intervention in World War II. British and Americans were both held responsible for the loss of the Holy Land to Israel.

Americans were remembered for their callus behavior in the First Gulf War. As the war came to an end, American planes dropped leaflets over Kurdistan and southern Iraq asking that the people rise up against Hussein. They rose. But instead of giving them the supplies they needed to fight, we ignored their requests and, in fact, granted Saddam the right to use helicopters. With the tanks that we had allowed to escape and the helicopters, the people in revolt were mowed down by the thousands.

American forces also chose in the First Gulf War and apparently in this war to ignore the usual principals of "civilized warfare" as they apply to enemy soldiers. Instead of burying dead Iraqi soldiers or making any attempt to identify where they were buried, they bulldozed over them. (See Fisk below.) Our massive bombardments at the beginning of the Second Gulf War served no real military purpose, but it destroyed much of the infrastructure that Iraqis used and took pride in. "Shock and Awe" is not a military strategy to win friends in its aftermath.

Iraqis also turned bitter when they saw the Americans holing up in cantonments behind strong walls while they let armed men of all persuasions, roam the streets to do their worst. They also became bitter when Americans broke into houses, arresting persons left and right with the scantiest of reasons. Iraqis are tied together in large kin groups, and everyone killed or abducted or imprisoned in these raids generated many future enemies.

Who Are We Fighting

Many suggest that the Coalition is in danger of getting caught in a civil war. It is certainly true that we are facing a wide variety of "enemies", and even some "friends" that are not always friendly. First are the fundamentalist Sunni radicals (al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and others). These include a number of non-Iraqis as well as Ansar al-islam. The second group are called nationalists. They include remnants of Saddam's army as well as others who simply want the Americans out. The third group includes Sunni and even Sufi religious organizations. Most defend Sunni areas and may attack Shi'a where they are a minority. The fourth group consists of various Shi'a militias. The Da'wa and Badr organizations have militias originally trained in Iran. They generally support the government and avoid battles with Coalition forces. Muqtada's Mahdi army is the largest Shi'a group. In some places it appears to be a militia defending its home turf. Elsewhere, it has been involved in pitched battles with the Americans and other militias.

The Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga is generally reliably on the American side. The police, on the other hand, are heavily infiltrated by Shi'a militias and are often accused of carrying out or at least not obstructing attacks on Sunnis. Many of our opponents are simply gangsters involved in hijacking trucks or capturing individuals for ransom.

There are elements of civil war in this picture, but most Iraqis want protection and security and will go along with whomever gives them these goods.

Sources:

CIA:World Factbook: Iraq, 2007.

Robert Fisk, [i]The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East[/i], A. A. Knopf, 2005.

Wikipedia: Iraq War

Thomas Ricks, [i]Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq[/i], Penguin Press, 2006.